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Elections as vehicles for change? Explaining different outcomes of democratic 
performance and government alternation in Africa1
Does having more regular elections improve democratic performance in Africa? And 
have elections transformed the patterns of alternation in government? To answer these 
questions, two analyses are conducted drawing on an original dataset of 179 elections in 
27 African countries, from the founding multiparty elections until 2019. The first tests 
the effects of alternation in government on democratic performance and shows that while 
alternation in government in the founding elections improves democratic performance, 
opposition victories in subsequent elections do not produce democratic gains. The second 
examines why alternation in government is more frequent in certain countries than in 
others; and reveals that the odds of turnover are increased by alternation in government in 
the founding elections, the level of political competition and the quality of elections. These 
findings contribute to literature linking elections, democracy and turnover in Africa. 
Keywords: Africa, alternation in government, democratic transition, level of 
political competition, quality of elections
Eleições enquanto veículos de mudança? Análise de variações no 
desempenho da democracia e na alternância no governo em África
Eleições regulares melhoram o desempenho da democracia em África? E qual o efei-
to das eleições nos padrões de competição pelo governo? Respondemos a estas questões 
através de duas análises empíricas que utilizam uma base de dados original com eleições 
realizadas em 17 países africanos desde as eleições fundadoras da era multipartidária até 
2019. A primeira testa o efeito da alternância no governo no desempenho da democracia, 
e demonstra que enquanto a alternância no governo nas eleições fundadoras melhora o 
desempenho da democracia no futuro, a vitória da oposição em eleições subsequentes não 
produz ganhos democráticos. A segunda examina porquê alguns países experimentam 
maior alternância no governo e outros menos; e revela que a probabilidade de alternância 
ao longo do tempo é maior, quando também houve alternância nas eleições fundadoras do 
multipartidarismo e as eleições são mais competitivas e justas. Estes resultados contri-
buem para a literatura que associa eleições, democracia e alternância em África.
Palavras-chave: África, alternância no governo, transição democrática, grau de 
competição política, qualidade das eleições
Recebido: 03 de dezembro de 2019
Aceite: 12 de dezembro de 2019
1  The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their careful reading and valuable feedback on prior 
iterations of this article. This work has been supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology 
through the project CEECIND/02527/2017 and the strategic project no. UID/SOC/50013/2019. 
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It is well established that free and fair elections are a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition of democracy (Schmitter & Karl, 1991), and Africa is no excep-
tion to this convention. Following the third wave of democratisation, the propor-
tion of countries organising multiparty elections rose from about 25% in 1988 to 
92% in 2012; 80% of these had held four or more elections, and 60% six or more 
elections (Van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). But what has the transformative impact 
of elections in Africa been? A decade ago, Lindberg claimed that repeated elec-
tions, even if not entirely free and fair, would promote democratic qualities in 
the long run (Lindberg, 2006a, p. 149). However, 30 years after the inception of 
democratic experiments in Africa, it is clear that most countries did not move 
linearly towards democracy. Although almost all countries in the region have 
introduced liberalisation reforms and conducted multiparty elections, only a few 
transitioned to a liberal democracy and are experiencing democratic consolida-
tion (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Cheeseman, 2015; Lynch & Crawford, 2011). 
In a study that covered elections held between 1990 and 2010, Lynch and 
Crawford demonstrate that while some African countries experience democratic 
progress, others slide back towards authoritarianism; but more importantly, most 
countries remain stuck as “‘hybrid regimes’, which are neither fully democratic 
nor classically authoritarian” (Lynch & Crawford, 2011, p. 281). Bleck and van 
de Walle (2019) recently argued that elections failed not only to generate demo-
cratic consolidation, but also to change the patterns of electoral competition. The 
authors demonstrate how incumbent presidents rely on an array of mechanisms 
– access to state resources, control of clientelistic and patronage networks – to 
survive electoral contests. Nevertheless, a handful of democratic success stories – 
Cabo Verde, Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mauritius and Senegal – show that 
frequent turnovers in government can go hand in hand with democratic devel-
opments (Sanches, 2018a). Thus, the relationship between elections, turnover and 
further democratisation is at best far from univocal, and includes experiences of 
success and failure (Cheeseman, 2015). 
This study examines whether elections are vehicles for change (a term we 
borrow from Cheeseman, 2010) in terms of both democratic performance and 
alternation in government. It addresses two fundamental questions: Does hav-
ing more regular elections improve democratic performance in Africa? And have 
elections transformed the patterns of alternation in government? These questions 
will be successively analysed in two empirical analyses. 
The first empirical analysis tests whether elections have contributed to fur-
ther democratisation in Africa. It takes democratic performance as the depend-
ent variable and focuses on government alternation (in the founding multiparty 
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elections and subsequent elections) as the key explanatory variable. In theory, 
consolidated democracies are expected to pass the “two-turnover” test so as to 
prove losers’ acceptance of the rules of the game (Cheeseman, 2010; Gasiorowski 
& Power, 1998; Huntington, 1991). Political alternation in this sense represents 
a moment when democratic procedures become accepted and routine, and are 
supported by the majority of the society, including the political actors (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996). However, in practice things are far more complex. On the one 
hand, most elections in Africa have not promoted democratic consolidation, 
which means democratic performance varies greatly (Bratton & van de Walle, 
1997; Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Cheeseman, 2015). On the other, although new 
opposition parties emerged during and after democratic transition, it is uncertain 
whether they were able to push democracy forward and accept the democrat-
ic rules of the game. Therefore, turnover may represent fresh opportunities for 
changes in the rules of competition but may not necessarily result in democratic 
gains if parties fail to act as democratic forces (Cheeseman, 2010; Wahman, 2014).
The second empirical analysis examines whether elections have changed the 
patterns of alternation in government. It has been argued that elections have 
brought little political change to Africa and that authoritarian parties/presidents 
have managed to thrive in the new multiparty era (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019; 
Bogaards, 2004; Rakner & Svåsand, 2002). Nevertheless, great variation has been 
found with some countries experiencing more episodes of transfer of power than 
others (Cheeseman, 2010; Sanches, 2018a). Understanding the sources of this var-
iation is the main motivation here. The second analysis takes government alter-
nation as a dependent variable, while alternation in government in the found-
ing multiparty elections, political competition and fairness of elections are the 
key independent variables. Overall, the two studies will allow us to understand 
whether elections have been a vehicle of change in Africa. 
The two empirical analyses draw on an original time-series cross-sectional 
dataset of 179 elections in 27 African countries, from the founding multiparty 
elections until May 2019. The main finding for the first study is that while gov-
ernment alternation in the founding elections impacts democratic performance 
over time, opposition victories in subsequent elections do not produce demo-
cratic gains. This means that opposition parties/leaders – as much as incumbent 
parties/leaders – fail to act as agents of democracy. The results of the second 
study reveal that alternation in government in the founding elections, the level of 
political competition and the quality of elections significantly increase the odds 
of government alternation in future elections. 
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Overall this study reveals that alternation in government and democratisation 
strengthen each other. On the one hand, alternation in the founding multiparty 
elections shapes the prospects of democratisation; on the other, democratic prin-
ciples such as political competition and clean elections increase the likelihood 
of turnover. These findings contribute to literature linking elections, democracy 
and turnover in Africa.
The study is organised as follows: The two theoretical sections outline the 
arguments and hypotheses linking elections to changes in democratic perfor-
mance and in patterns of alternation in government over time. The methodo-
logical section clarifies how the main hypotheses will be tested, operationalises 
the dependent and independent variables in each study, and presents data on 
democratisation and government alternation in Africa. The empirical section dis-
cusses the main results of the statistical models estimated. The conclusion reflects 
on the implications of our findings for future research on democracy, elections 
and turnover in Africa. 
Elections as a vehicle of democratic performance 
Democratisation is far from a linear process as it involves complex dynam-
ics, timing and sequences between liberalisation, transition and consolidation 
(Schneider & Schmitter, 2004). Focusing on democratisation rather than its out-
come – democracy – allows us to observe regime performance in Africa over time 
and space, and why some countries manage to progress while others experience 
democratic backslide or remain stuck in hybrid regimes. Democratisation is usu-
ally explained on the basis of certain requisites such as homogenous social struc-
ture, economic development (or modernisation), pro-democratic political cul-
ture, power sharing political institutions and international context (Gasiorowski 
& Power, 1998; Norris, 2008; Teorell, 2010). Democratic performance, as it is used 
here and will be explained later, is assessed using as references political rights, 
civil liberties, checks and balances, rule of law, and the quality of elections. 
In the African setting, scholars have put forward innovative theses of democ-
ratisation, one of which addresses the role of elections. In his seminal work The 
Surprising Significance of African Elections, Staffan Lindberg (2006a) made an 
important contribution to the prolific debate on how elections affect democra-
tisation. Whilst acknowledging that elections are not the only nor the main ex-
planatory factor for democratisation, Lindberg suggests that holding repeated 
elections in the new electoral regimes in Africa fosters and develops democratic 
qualities (Lindberg, 2006a, p. 149). Under Lindberg’s main argument, even if reg-
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ular elections in the case of sub-Saharan Africa were flawed, they contributed 
to democratisation in the long run as they stimulated processes and behaviour 
that change citizens’ and institutions’ practices and attitudes toward democra-
cy. In this sense, elections turn citizens into voters who demand responses and 
hold their representatives accountable by encouraging them to pressure political 
leaders to defend democratic principles, thus promoting a democratic mind-set 
in society. Moreover, civic organisations learn and create social capital to defend 
political rights and civil liberties, state institutions and officials see the impor-
tance of defending civil liberties, and the media takes on an increased role in 
protecting and promoting democracy (Lindberg, 2006a). 
Reacting to Lindberg’s argument on “democratisation by elections”, Bogaards 
(2013) argues that it is also true that multiparty elections helped perpetuate 
non-democratic leaders on the continent. Democratisation by elections also has 
different patterns of stability and change, with free countries remaining free and 
electoral autocracies remaining autocracies. Based on the analysis of 324 multipar-
ty elections up to 2011 in 43 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Bogaards concludes 
that only five of those that held at least two consecutive multiparty elections 
went through a democratisation process by elections, and two of these reverted 
to electoral authoritarianism. In the same vein, based on the cases of Southeast 
Asia where authoritarian regimes oversaw 88 competitive elections from 1945 to 
2015, Morgenbesser and Pepinsky argue that elections did not necessarily result 
in democracy in the region over time, since only two countries – the Philippines 
and Indonesia – are currently electoral democracies (Morgenbesser & Pepinsky, 
2018). According to Bogaards, these findings call for the revision of the argument 
of democratisation by elections and the need to combine electoral reform with 
conditions that favour alternation in power, which is considered a key element 
for democratisation in the recent growing literature of the field (Bogaards, 2013).
Turnover is an important benchmark of the democratisation process (Lodge, 
2013). The argument is that democracy establishes itself when an incumbent par-
ty loses an election, and it is consolidated when at least two turnovers occur 
after the introduction of democratic elections (Huntington, 1991). As mentioned 
previously, the regularity of elections on the continent did not necessarily re-
sult in full-fledged democratisation. One of the critical points in the process is 
turnover, with many examples of leaders or parties maintaining themselves in 
power despite the regularity of elections and the introduction of limits on terms 
(Cheeseman, 2010; Tull & Simons, 2017). 
Most studies in the field focus on power transfers at the presidential level, 
showing that specific traits and trends of African politics have prevented the 
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continent from democratically ensuring a transfer of power (Cheeseman, 2010). 
Military takeover of power is one such trait and, albeit not specific to the conti-
nent, it has implications on turnover. In Africa, leaders who took power militarily 
were found to be reluctant to relinquish power voluntarily and tend to stay in 
power until they die or their health fails (Durotoye, 2016). Although the African 
Union and international donors’ organisations oppose the unconstitutional pro-
longing of terms, they have been neither effective nor proactive in enforcing such 
rules and have allowed African leaders to resort to these practices in impunity 
(Durotoye, 2016; Tull & Simons, 2017). 
The so-called “third-termism” or “third term bids” is another growing trend; 
this hallmark of Africa’s democratic backsliding is characterised by the manipu-
lative stance of democratically elected leaders altering the Constitution to change 
the terms’ limit to remain in power longer, thus hampering the prospects of al-
ternation in power (Durotoye, 2016; Tull & Simons, 2017). From 1990 to 2016, 
over 10 African presidents tried to amend the constitution to alter the term limits 
(Durotoye, 2016; Tull & Simons, 2017) and there has been a democratic backslid-
ing in the continent (Bogaards, 2013). Even countries formally hailed as success 
stories like Mozambique are experiencing a democratic backsliding (Muchemwa 
& Harris, 2018). Term limits are key mechanisms for the institutionalisation of 
power and for democratisation because they influence the way leaders come to 
office or leave power in a context where, according to some scholars, politics have 
been historically dominated by “big men” that are particularly resilient and good 
at manipulating institutions to stay in power (Tull & Simons, 2017). 
Given this scenario, what is the (democratic) role of opposition parties? Can 
turnover at the government level lead to further democratisation? Rakner & van 
de Walle (2009) posit that strong opposition parties are a central component of 
any strategy of democratisation by elections, and that “opposition parties’ evolv-
ing ability to compete politically should in theory correlate with the level and 
quality of democratic practice” (Rakner & van de Walle, 2009, p. 109). However, 
several studies suggest that the democratic role of opposition parties is far from 
guaranteed. 
Drawing on a dataset consisting of 210 elections in electoral regimes in Africa, 
Lindberg (2006b) demonstrated that opposition parties’ participatory behav-
iour – that is their decision to either contest or boycott elections – significant-
ly improved the democratic qualities of elections and he therefore concluded 
that opposition behaviour was an “important determinant of democratisation 
by elections” (Lindberg, 2006b, p. 133). On the other hand, Cheeseman (2010) 
relies on illustrative case studies to highlight the variation and unpredictability 
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of turnover (at the presidential level) in Africa: while Benin witnessed positive 
improvements after the transfer of power in 1991, this was not the case in Zambia 
or Kenya. Using data on competitive authoritarian regimes between 1989 and 
2008, Wahman (2014) offers additional insights into this discussion. The study 
starts by demonstrating that newly elected governments are not more prone to 
democratic development than re-elected ones, before specifying the conditions 
under which this may vary. Wahman argues that when elected governments are 
uncertain about the prospects of their re-election – which is more common in 
weakly institutionalised party systems – they will be more reluctant to reduce the 
incumbents’ advantage through further democratisation (Wahman, 2014, p. 221). 
This argument is illustrated with the case studies of Senegal, Kenya and Ghana. 
We aim to contribute to this discussion by re-evaluating the conditions un-
der which government alternation leads to democratisation. This is innovative 
as the trend in the field has been to analyse power transfers at the presiden-
tial level (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Cheeseman, 2010), thus neglecting the 
governmental arena, and the role of political parties. The first explanation here 
proposed focuses on path dependency, and argues that government alternation 
during transition helps improve democratic performance in the future. Several 
scholars have developed a path dependency argument to explore how the mode 
of transition from authoritarian rule shaped the prospects of democratic consoli-
dation in Southern Europe and Latin America (Munck & Leff, 1997; O’Donnell & 
Schmitter, 1986; Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Our goal is to extend this logic in order 
to understand the long-term impact of government alternation during transition 
on democratisation. 
The minimalist definition of path dependency is that “what has happened 
at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of 
events occurring at a later point in time” (Sewell, 1996, p. 263, cited in Mahoney 
& Schensul, 2006, p. 459). This is expected because as the process advances the 
“costs of exit” – switching to some previously plausible alternative – rise (Pierson, 
2000, p. 252). Democratic transitions can be conceived as “formative or founding 
moments” that shape subsequent political developments (Munck & Leff, 1997, p. 
343). They affect “the form of post-transitional regime and politics through” their 
“influence on the pattern of elite competition, on the institutional rules crafted 
during the transition, and on key actors’ acceptance or rejection of the new rules 
of the game” (Munck & Leff, 1997, p. 345). 
During the African democratic wave, many countries held multiparty elec-
tions for the first time ever or in decades. Bratton and van de Walle (1997, p. 196) 
allude to the relevance of founding elections when saying that “they heralded 
regime transition in the sense that they laid down new procedures of political 
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competition that broke down with monopolistic authoritarian antecedents and 
established the potential for democratic rule”. The numerous opposition parties 
that formed during this period and participated at the polls had different degrees 
of success, as incumbents managed to be elected in many countries. Nevertheless, 
the losers’ acceptance of the results in countries like São Tomé and Príncipe, Cabo 
Verde or Benin, to mention just a few examples, demonstrated a new attachment 
to democratic rules and principles (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, p. 197). In sum, 
founding elections can be perceived as key moments when pro-democratic be-
haviours and norms emerge, and this can shape regime performance over time. 
Experiences of turnover at the transition stage are, therefore, meaningful, not 
because they immediately lead to democracy but because they introduce changes 
in the status quo, hence:
Hypothesis 1 (path dependency): Government alternation in the founding mul-
tiparty elections positively impacts democratisation over time.
However, the democratic gains of turnover after the transition are less obvi-
ous over time. As previously discussed, opposition parties do not always act as 
forces of democratisation (Cheeseman, 2010) and once in government they may 
try to revert democratic gains if they fear electoral defeat (Wahman, 2014). The 
current trends of democratic backslide and authoritarian resurgence in countries 
that have experienced turnover – at the executive and/or presidential level – sug-
gest that a power shift may not necessarily lead to further democratic develop-
ment. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2 (democratisation by turnover): Government alternation following 
the founding elections has a smaller effect on democratisation. 
Elections as vehicles for government alternation 
Several studies suggest that multiparty elections have had a limited trans-
formative impact on African party systems: incumbent authoritarian parties 
and leaders managed to be re-elected (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019; Rakner & 
Svåsand, 2002) and dominant party systems have proliferated in most countries 
(Bogaards, 2008). However, more variation emerges when we revisit the studies 
that analysed the impact of elections on party systems using indicators of sta-
bility (Lindberg, 2007) or institutionalisation2 (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Rield, 
2  Institutionalisation is “the process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely 
known, if not universally accepted” (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 25) while stability – the most important dimension of 
institutionalisation – expresses the extent to which a stable set of parties interact in relatively stable ways over 
time (Mainwaring, 2018). Indicators of institutionalisation include, inter alia, volatility, vote difference between 
elections, mean age of parties, share of seats for historical parties, party identification (Mainwaring, 1999), while 
stability is usually measured by different types of volatility. 
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2014; Sanches, 2018a). But regardless of the metric used, these studies reveal that 
party systems differ substantively in how they operate – some countries have 
experienced more change between elections while others less. 
To explain diversity in the level of stability or institutionalisation, scholars 
have resorted to a set of explanations based on history, economy, political in-
stitutions and social structure. It has been argued that authoritarian legacies – 
strategies of power accumulation and clientelistic networks established during 
authoritarianism – have a greater impact on African party systems than econom-
ic performance and type of political institutions (Riedl, 2014). Ferree (2010) and 
Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) provide some support for social structure expla-
nations when showing that parties’ ability to form winning coalition of ethnic 
groups helps stabilise the party systems. Finally, incumbency is an important 
advantage in the context of an uneven playing field where opposition parties’ 
lack of access to state resources affects their ability to distribute patronage and 
develop strong nation-wide structures (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019; Cheeseman, 
2010; Wahman, 2017).
In what regards political alternation, several studies draw interesting de-
scriptive inferences from the analysis of presidential elections (Bratton & van 
de Walle, 1997; Cheeseman, 2010; Lodge, 2013). Looking at elections from the 
1990s until 2010, Lodge (2013) finds that 15 countries experienced an orderly suc-
cession of presidents of different party affiliation either during or following the 
transition, while 12 countries did not experience power transfer – not even once. 
Some variation is also captured by Cheeseman (2010) using data from presiden-
tial elections held between 1990 and 2009. Finally, Sanches (2018a) measured the 
patterns of alternation in government in Africa using data on 178 elections held 
in 30 (hybrid or) democratic countries between the founding multiparty elections 
and 2016. The study shows great variation across countries, with alternation in 
government occurring in half of the elections held in the observed period. 
While these studies are important contributions for our understanding of elec-
toral politics in Africa since the introduction of multiparty elections, the question 
of why some countries experience more alternation in government than others 
remains unanswered. To contribute to this discussion, the explanatory model 
developed here focuses on the effects of path dependency, the level of political 
competition and the quality of elections as key explanatory factors. The rationale 
connecting each of these factors to alternation in power is discussed next. 
The first explanation is that current trends of electoral competition in Africa 
trace back to the transition stage. Parties’ ability to succeed in the founding multi-
party polls crucially shaped both competition in the short-term and future rounds 
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of elections (path dependency). As explained previously, this is expected because 
the democratic transitions are critical junctures of party formation and institu-
tional crafting during which party elites (incumbents and newcomers) seek to 
minimise the odds of losing power. The choices they make at this point will in-
fluence the kind of competition that will emerge in the future even if they are 
confronted with high levels of uncertainty (Lupu & Riedl, 2013, p. 1344). Studies 
from South European countries are illustrative of the importance of the transi-
tion. In fact, they show how this period had a “significant impact in shaping the 
new parties (party unit level) and relations among parties (party system level)”, 
namely by determining patterns of coalition and alternation in power over time 
(Cotta, 1996, p. 73). 
In the African setting, several studies make path dependency a plausible ar-
gument when explaining patterns of government alternation; we elaborate this 
further. It has been demonstrated that second elections in Africa resembled the 
early founding round in terms of winners and losers and levels of political par-
ticipation (Bratton, 1998). Voters “generally sought continuity in political leader-
ship in the aftermath of turbulent interludes of regime transition” (Bratton, 1998, 
p. 61). And studies covering more years and elections reveal that the events of 
the early 1990s crucially shaped future rounds of elections (Bleck & van de Walle, 
2019). The incumbent’s success in the founding multiparty elections was crucial 
for political dominance/stability over time and to reduce the opportunities for 
alternation; but once a country experiences one alternation, the probability of 
another in future elections increases (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019). Thus we for-
mulate that: 
Hypothesis 3 (path dependency): Countries that experienced alternation in gov-
ernment in the founding elections are more likely to experience it again in future 
rounds of elections.
The second explanation observes levels of competition during elections. 
According to Bartolini and Mair (1990), electoral volatility is influenced by the 
number of parties in competition as the probability that each individual voter 
will vote for the same party in two consecutive elections will decline as the num-
ber of different available options increases. In other words, limited political offer 
is expected to lower the level of volatility and thus the likelihood of electoral 
shifts in government. Early empirical assessments of elections in Africa recog-
nise that leadership alternation3 was associated with close races (Bratton, 1998, p. 
64); and subsequent research found a positive relationship between the number 
of electoral parties and party system institutionalisation (Kuenzi & Lambright, 
3  Leadership alternation refers to electoral turnover of chief political executives (Bratton, 1998, p. 54).
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2001; Sanches, 2018a) or stability (Ferree, 2010). This discussion informs the fol-
lowing hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4 (level of political competition): The larger the number of relevant 
electoral parties, the greater the probability of alternation in government.
The final explanation concerns the quality of elections. The minimalist defini-
tion of democracy requires political leaders to be chosen in competitive, free and 
fair elections (Dahl, 1971). However, elections in Africa are the world’s worst in 
terms of electoral integrity (Norris & Grömping, 2019). Twenty years ago, Bratton 
(1998) noted that the quality of multiparty elections in Africa deteriorated over 
time: in the second elections held after the transition, presidents resorted to exec-
utive power to rig the rules against their challengers. He also added that:
In contrast to electoral volatility and incumbent turnovers in second elections in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, dominant parties in Africa have usually been 
able to reinforce their supremacy the second time around. After a period of turbu-
lent transitions, African politics is returning to an institutional legacy of “big man” 
rule, and the electoral alternation of leaders is again becoming abnormal. (Bratton, 
1998, p. 65) 
More recent appraisals of elections and democracy in Africa note that vote 
buying, intimidation and harassment have been used to skew the competition in 
favour of the incumbent parties (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019; Cheeseman & Klaas, 
2018). Hence, the final hypothesis postulates: 
Hypothesis 5 (quality of elections): The cleaner the elections, the greater the 
probability of alternation in government. 
Methods and data 
To test the hypotheses raised in this study, we draw on an original dataset of 
179 parliamentary elections held in 27 countries from the founding multiparty 
elections until May 2019. As can be seen in annex A, most elections were conduct-
ed between 1990 and 2019 but the analysis also includes the cases of Botswana, 
Mauritius and The Gambia where multiparty elections have been held since the 
1960s. The countries included in this study score at least partly free in the lat-
est Freedom House report, they hold competitive elections regularly4, and have 
(minimum) legal provisions that guarantee political rights and civil liberties. 
4  Not interrupted by episodes of political instability or major armed conflicts as these have a profound effect 
on parties and party systems (e.g. some parties are banned or dissolved and formal rules are frequently changed 
with the draft of new constitutional laws). For instance, in the case of Nigeria, only elections since 1999 were 
included. 
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The dependent variables 
Two types of analysis will be performed using democratic performance and al-
ternation in government as dependent variables. Democratic performance is meas-
ured by the Varieties of Democracy Project’s Liberal democracy index which varies 
from low to high (0-1). This index takes into account political rights, civil liber-
ties, checks and balances, rule of law, and the electoral component of democracy.
As can be observed in Figure 1, the countries included in this study vary sub-
stantively in terms of democratic performance. In the overall depiction, Cabo 
Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana, Senegal and 
Benin are exemplary cases of democratic progress and they have been system-
atically rated the best democracies in Africa – despite some internal variations. 
Cases such as Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Madagascar or Lesotho 
have witness periods of both progress and, more recently, democratic retreat. 




























Figure 1: Democratic performance (country, averages) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on V-Dem data (https://www.v-dem.net/) 
Note: Liberal democracy index (D) (v2x_libdem). To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy 
achieved?
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The second dependent variable – alternation in government – measures wheth-
er there was wholesale, partial or no alternation in power following the elections 
(Casal Bértoa & Enyedi, 2016; Mair, 1996). In the first scenario (wholesale alter-
nation), the incumbent government leaves office and is totally replaced by a new 
party or coalition. In the second scenario (partial alternation), the new cabinet 
contains both new parties and old ones from the previous government. In the 
third scenario (no alternation), alternation is complete absent and the same party 
or parties remain in exclusive control of government (Mair, 1996). To compute 
the variable, we analysed all parliamentary/general elections and verified wheth-
er there was a transfer of power at the government level following the elections. 
Figure 2: Alternation in government in 27 countries (as of May 2019) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration
As exhibited in Figure 2, there are striking variations across countries: 87 out 
of 179 elections produced no alternation in power, while wholesale alternation 
occurred 50 times and partial alternation 42 times. Botswana, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania never experienced alternation of power. 
The dominant parties, respectively the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), Frente 
de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), South-West African People’s Organisation 
(SWAPO), African National Congress (ANC) and the Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM), successfully managed to close political competition and deter new par-
ty entries. Cabo Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, and Niger are among the 
countries where elections produce regular alternation in power. The two major 
29Edalina Rodrigues Sanches & José Jaime Macuane
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos  •  julho-dezembro de 2019  •  38, 15-40
parties in Cabo Verde – Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde (PAICV) 
and Movimento para a Democracia (MPD) – have peacefully rotated in government 
since the founding democratic elections. Just a few months after its foundation 
in March 1990, the MPD unexpectedly won the founding multiparty elections 
in 1991 and repeated the win in 1995 and more recently in 2016. After losing 
parliamentary elections in 1991 and 1995, the PAICV won subsequent elections 
(2001, 2006, and 2011) with broad parliamentary support (more than 50% of the 
seats). Similarly, in Ghana the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) are the two largest parties in the system and the only ones to 
have legitimate expectations of forming one-party cabinets. The NDC won elec-
tions in 1992, 1996, 2008 and 2012, while the NPP took power in 2000, 2004, and 
2016. 
In contrast, several countries appear to have a more unpredictable electoral 
market. Benin has the most open party system, with partial alternation in govern-
ment in all elections since 1995. The only exception is the founding multiparty 
election in which there was wholesale alternation. In São Tomé and Príncipe and 
Mauritius, most elections also resulted in the formation of cabinets combining 
both new and incumbent parties. Finally, elections in countries such as Lesotho 
and Burkina Faso led to partial, wholesale or no alternation in government. 
The independent variables and controls 
In the first study, where the dependent variable is democratic performance, 
there are two main independent variables: alternation in government in the found-
ing elections, which is coded 1 if there was wholesale or partial alternation during 
the transition, and 0 otherwise; and alternation in government following the found-
ing elections, which is also measured dichotomously (1= wholesale or partial al-
ternation; 0= non alternation) but takes into account all elections held from the 
transition until 2019. These variables allow us to test the underlying assumptions 
of our two hypotheses, namely whether alternation in government in founding 
elections (hypothesis 1) and subsequent elections (hypothesis 2) impacts demo-
cratic performance over time. 
These hypotheses are tested alongside a set of controls that are usually linked 
to democratisation. Ethnicity is often related to democratic performance, but the 
relationship between the two is far from straightforward. Reilly (2001), for in-
stance, argued that highly fragmented societies can experience democratic pro-
gress if no group can control power alone. Ethnicity is measured with Alesina et 
al. (2003) Fractionalisation Data, which varies from 0 (homogeneity) to 1 (heter-
ogeneity) and collapses the degree of linguistic, ethnic and religious fractionali-
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sation within a country. GDP growth (annual %) is retrieved from the World Bank 
and accounts for the economic explanations for democratisation. The models also 
account for type of electoral system (1= plurality; 0= otherwise), form of govern 
(1= presidential; 0= otherwise), and time (measured as years since the first multi-
party elections) for different reasons. Plurality formulas are known to increase the 
potential for conflict, and democratic breakdown given their winner takes all na-
ture, while proportional representation favours proportionality and power shar-
ing between competing forces (Norris, 2008). There is lack of consensus when it 
comes to forms of government: while some warn of the perils of presidentialism 
(van Cranenburgh, 2008; van de Walle, 2003), others show that presidentialism 
is not inherently bad and suggest that it bears negatively on democratisation 
when combined with high levels of party fragmentation and ethnic politicisation 
(Sanches, 2018b). Time since the first multiparty elections accounts for the more 
temporal dynamics of democratisation in Africa, and provides for an additional 
control of the democratisation by elections argument. Given the temporal and 
cross-sectional nature of the data and type of the dependent variable, we esti-
mated a linear regression correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) in 
STATA with the command xtpcse. 
The second study, for which alternation in government is the dependent vari-
able, has three main independent variables as indicated in hypotheses 3, 4 and 
5: alternation in government in the founding elections which is measured dichoto-
mously as in the first study (1= wholesale or partial alternation; 0= non alter-
nation); political competition which is calculated following Laakso & Taagepera 
(1979) Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) formula; and, finally, quality 
of elections which is measured by the Varieties of Democracy clean elections in-
dex5 (varies from 0= low to 1= high). These independent variables will enter the 
regression models alongside a set of controls, considered relevant to electoral 
competition in Africa. 
As in the prior study, we control for ethnicity (as measured by Alesina et 
al., 2003) which significantly shapes party formation and competition in Africa 
(Ferree, 2010; Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014). Least squares index (LSq) is the sec-
ond control, measuring the disproportionality between the distribution of votes 
and of seats; it is therefore of a finer measure of the effects of electoral systems on 
party systems. It is expected that higher disproportionality will favour the incum-
bent and major parties vis-à-vis opponents and smaller parties (Colomer, 2005). 
5  “Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of 
the opposition, vote buying, and election violence”. See codebook, variable v2xel_frefair https://www.v-dem.net/
media/filer_public/e6/d2/e6d27595-9d69-4312-b09f-63d2a0a65df2/v-dem_codebook_v9.pdf
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The robustness of civil society is measured by the Varieties of Democracy Core 
civil society index6 (varies from 0= low to 1= high), which allows us to control for 
the fact that the strength of civil society might influence the kind of alternatives 
that can emerge and put pressure on the incumbent government (Bratton & van 
de Walle, 1997). A set of variables – drawn from the World Bank – are also add-
ed to account for the macro-structural changes that can foster political change. 
These include GDP growth (annual %), urban population (as %) and unemployment 
(% of total labour force; modelled ILO estimate). Finally, a variable measuring 
number of elections was included to identify any significant changes over repeat-
ed elections. Once again, given the temporal and cross-sectional structure of the 
data and the binary nature of the dependent variable, we estimated logistic re-
gressions in STATA with the command xtlogit. Basic descriptive statistics of the 
independent and control variables used in both studies are presented in annex B. 
Main results 
The first study tests the effects of alternation in government on democratisa-
tion, and the results of the models estimated are presented in Table 1. Model 1 
includes the key independent variables – alternation in the founding elections, 
and alternation following the founding elections; Model 2 adds the controls. 
The results confirm our theoretical expectations. First, if a country has expe-
rienced a power transfer during democratic transition, this strongly influences 
its capacity to continue to democratise over time. In other words, political alter-
nations are unique formative moments when new democratic values and expec-
tations are formed. Over time, countries that managed to democratise the most 
during the transition stage and experienced a peaceful transfer of power, experi-
enced more positive democratic developments. However, and as most literature 
suggests, whether or not a country experiences alternation in future elections is 
not important to democratisation (Cheeseman, 2010; Wahman, 2014). As our data 
show, in addition to there being no significant effect of government turnover on 
democratisation, the association is negative. That is, opposition victories did not 
bring democratic gains and, ultimately, this means democracy is poorly rooted 
at the elite level, both in governing and opposition elites. In short, this first study 
confirms hypotheses 1 and 2. Though our expectations were confirmed it is im-
portant to note that the models have relatively low explanatory power (Model 1 
6 The core civil society index provides “a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys 
autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however 
conceived”. See codebook, variable v2xcs_ccsi https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/e6/d2/e6d27595-9d69-
4312-b09f-63d2a0a65df2/v-dem_codebook_v9.pdf
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R-square = 0.02; Model 2 R-square = 0.15) which suggest that other variables must 
be included in the analysis. 
Table 1 
The effect of alternation in government on democracy in Africa
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Main independent variables    
Alternation in government in the founding elections 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)** 
Alternation in government following the founding elections -0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Controls    
Ethnicity  -0.06 (0.03)+ 
GDP growth   0.00 (0.00) 
Plurality  0.05 (0.03)* 
Presidentialism  -0.09 (0.02)*** 
Years since the first multiparty elections  -0.01 (0.00)* 
Constant 0.37 (0.02)*** 0.37(0.02)*** 
Year dummies no yes 
Observations 165 163 
Groups 27 27 
R-squared   0.02 0.15 
 
Notes: significant at +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0,001. Dependent variable is Quality of democra-
cy measured by the Liberal democracy index which varies from low to high (0-1). Given the temporal 
and cross-sectional structure of the data and the type of dependent variable, the regression models 
were estimated with the command xtpcse in STATA. Multicolinearity is within acceptable standards 
(that is <10): in Model 1 the mean VIF = 2.36; and in Model 2 the mean VIF = 3.09 (estimated with the 
command vif, uncentered).
Turning to the sources of government alternation: Which factors matter the 
most? The second study provides answers to this question. Table 2 presents two 
models seeking to test our assumptions on the role of alternation in government 
in the founding multiparty elections, level of political competition and quality of 
elections on government turnover. Using a similar structure, we first estimated a 
model with the three main independent variables and a lagged dependent varia-
ble to account for the prior outcome for alternation in government (Model 3), and 
then added the controls (Model 4). 
Taken together, the results corroborate hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. Hypothesis 3 
posited that countries that experienced alternation in government in the found-
ing elections would be more likely to experience alternation in successive rounds 
of elections, and this is confirmed in both models: the two variables are positive-
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ly and significantly correlated, hence confirming the importance of transitional 
legacies and their structuring of competition in the future. Hypothesis 4 tested 
the assumption that close races had a significant impact on the likelihood of gov-
ernment alternation; this is confirmed by our results: a larger number of effective 
electoral parties has a significant and positive effect on alternation in govern-
ment. Finally, hypothesis 5 predicted that clean elections favour alternation; and 
indeed, the results show a strong association between the two variables in both 
our models. This set of results reveals the significance of democratic credentials 
to alternation. In fact, both political competition and quality of elections are part 
of minimalist definitions of democracy. 
Table 2 
The sources of alternation in power in Africa
 
  Model 3 Model 4 
Alternation in government in the founding elections 1.84 (0.61)** 1.92 (0.59)** 
Political Competition (ENEP) 0.62 (0.20)** 0.68 (0.22)** 
Quality of elections (Clean elections index) 2.45 (1.27)+ 6.71 (2.36)** 
Controls  
  
Alternation in government lagged 0.34 (0.57) 0.42 (0.47) 
Ethnicity 
 -1.36 (1.65) 
LSq 
 -0.03 (0.03) 
Robustness of civil society  
 -6.66 (2.43)** 
Unemployment  
 -0.04 (0.03) 
GDP growth  
 0.00 (0.02) 
Urban population  
 -0.03 (0.02) 
Number of elections 
 -0.05 (0.13) 
Constant -4.68 (1.14)*** 1.16 (2.30) 
lnsig2u -0.95 (1.82) -12.23 (35.78) 
sigma_u 0.62(0.56) 0.00 (0.04) 
rho 0.10 (0.17) 0.00 (0.00) 
Observations  159 136 
Groups 27 26 
 
Notes: significant at +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0,001. Dependent variable is Alternation 
in Government measured dichotomously (1= wholesale or partial alternation; 0= non-alter-
nation). Given the temporal and cross-sectional structure of the data and the type of depend-
ent variable, the regression models were estimated with the command xtlogit in STATA. 
Multicolinearity is within acceptable standards (that is <10): in Model 3 the mean VIF = 1.31; 
and in Model 4 the mean VIF = 1.63 (estimated with the command collin).
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Overall, the two studies conducted herein reveal the importance of path de-
pendence, more specifically, that of transition legacies to future political devel-
opments in Africa. They also show that government alternation and democrati-
sation are strongly interrelated; especially at the early phase of democratisation, 
when new (democratic) values are adopted by the political actors, and start em-
bodying the political game from the beginning of the process. 
Conclusion 
Although multiparty elections have become commonplace in Africa, it is also 
true that most countries have not seen democratic gains and that the same po-
litical class continues in power. So do more elections bring more democracy to 
Africa? And have they transformed the patterns of competition for government? 
The great variation found across African countries suggests that the answer is 
far from straightforward. In fact, it is necessary to revisit the arguments linking 
elections to democracy and turnover, and cover a larger time span and more 
countries than prior studies. 
We relied on an original dataset of 179 elections in 27 countries to examine 
whether elections are vehicles for improved democratic performance and alter-
nation in government; and performed two tests with democratic performance and 
government alternation as dependent variables. The first set of findings reveals 
that although government alternation in the founding elections positively impacts 
democratic performance, opposition victories in subsequent elections do not pro-
duce democratic gains. This finding underlines the role of democratic transitions 
as critical junctures when the seeds for the future flourishing of democracy are 
planted. However, the fact that alternation in government in subsequent elec-
tions has a limited impact on democratisation is revealing of the weak demo-
cratic role of opposition parties, which – like incumbent parties/leaders – fail to 
improve the democratic credentials of the regime once in power. 
The second set of findings relate to why some countries experience more 
transfers of power than others. The results of our statistical models demonstrate 
that government alternation during transition, the level of political competition and the 
quality of elections significantly increase the odds of turnover over time in Africa; 
this implies that alternation in government results from a mix of structural and 
contextual factors. 
Together, these findings further the existing literature in three complemen-
tary ways. First, they show that what happened during transition is still impor-
tant and shapes democratic developments and competition for power in Africa 
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today. While prior studies explored the impact of colonial heritage on democ-
racy (Bernhard et al., 2004), or the role of authoritarian and transition legacies 
on party system development (LeBas, 2011; Riedl, 2014; Sanches, 2018a), to the 
best of our knowledge this is the first large-N study that assesses the impact of 
transitional outcomes – more specifically turnover in founding elections – for the 
prospects of democratisation and government alternation in Africa. Second, they 
highlight the notion that the fairness of elections matters for government alterna-
tion which, on a more negative note, is revealing of the uneven playing field in 
Africa and of the ways in which incumbency advantage, electoral malpractices 
and authoritarian practices continue to distort the character of African elections 
and nature of representation. Thirdly, the results are also telling of the fact that 
alternation and democratisation strengthen each other. On the one hand, alter-
nation in government in the founding multiparty elections shapes the prospects 
of democratisation; on the other, democratic principles such as political competi-
tion and clean elections increase the likelihood of turnover over time. 
Overall, this study shows that elections produce a diversity of outcomes in 
terms of both democratic developments and alternation in government. This var-
iation is largely explained by historical legacies and continuous struggles over 
the rules of the game. It also raises issues on why political alternation after tran-
sition does not necessarily lead to further democratisation. This is an unexplored 
area deserving further study. An insight that emerges from this study is that the 
conditions that lead political elites to embrace democratic values in Africa mat-
ters for understanding democratisation. It would also be interesting to explore 
political culture and socialisation in future studies, by analysing the political 
trajectories and socialisation of the incoming elites that replace the incumbents 
when political alternation occurs. 
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ANNEX 
A - Countries and elections covered 
 
Country  Elections covered 
Benin 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 
Botswana 1969, 1974,1979,1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019 
Burkina Faso 1992,1997, 2002, 2007, 2015 
Cape Verde 1991, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016 
Comoros 1992, 1993, 1996, 2004, 2009, 2015 
Gambia, The 1966, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017 
Ghana 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 
Guinea-Bissau 1994, 1999, 2004, 2008, 2014, 2018 
Kenya 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2013, 2017 
Lesotho 1993, 1998, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2015, 2017 
Liberia 2005, 2011, 2014, 2017 
Madagascar 1993, 1998, 2002, 2007, 2013, 2019 
Malawi 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019 
Mali 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2013, 2018 
Mauritius 1976, 1982, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2014 
Mozambique 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 
Namibia  1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 
Niger  1993, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2011, 2016  
Nigeria 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 
São Tomé and Príncipe 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2016 
Senegal 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2001, 2007, 2012, 2017 
Seychelles 1993, 1998, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2016 
Sierra Leone 2002, 2007, 2012, 2018 
South Africa  1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019 
Tanzania 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 
Togo  1994, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2013, 2018 
Zambia 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016 
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B - Descriptive statistics on independent variables and controls 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Main Independent Variables 
     
Alternation in the founding elections  
     
No 10 
    
Wholesale or partial  17 
    
Political Competition (ENEP) 160 3.4 2.3 1.3 14.9 
Quality of elections (Clean elections 
index) 
179 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.9 
Controls  
     
Core civil society index 179 0.8 0.1 0.3 1.0 
Lsq 160 11.5 9.5 0.3 46.2 
Ethnicity 179 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.8 
GDP growth   179 4.7 8.7 -12.7 106.3 
Unemployment  156 8.9 8.0 0.3 37.2 
Urban population  179 37.1 13.9 6.8 74.0 
Elections under plurality  89 
    
Elections under presidentialism  65 
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